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This paper looks at a particular aspect of the Smart Procurement Initiative which 
was announced in the Strategic Defence Review, that of Integrated Project Teams. 
These teams aim to bring together all the relevant stakeholders from the Ministry 
of Defence, armed forces and industry. Much has been written on the perceived 
benefits these teams will bring to the procurement process in their management of 
a project from ‘cradle to grave’. This paper examines the potential pitfalls that lay 
ahead and the factors the Ministry of Defence will have to take into account in 
order for them to succeed. 
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Introduction 
 
“We trained hard….but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up 
into teams we would be reorganised, [and] I was to learn later in life that we tend 
to meet any new situation by reorganising: and what a wonderful method it can be 
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for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and 
demoralisation.”1 
 
“History knows many more armies ruined by want and disorder than by the efforts 
of their enemies.”2 
 
With the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union, 
the monolithic threat to Western Europe disappeared and many governments took 
the opportunity to obtain a ‘peace dividend’. This has meant the reduction of 
defence spending and the reallocation of those funds to other areas of public 
spending. However, the ‘New World Order’ has taken a direction, which is rather 
different from that forecast. Instead of the one major threat, there is now a 
multitude of smaller ones, which cannot be met with large conventional forces 
stationed in the Central Europe, but will have to be countered by smaller 
intervention forces capable of rapid deployment. 
 
This reorientation, so far as the United Kingdom’s Armed Forces were concerned, 
was announced in the Strategic Defence Review, in July 1998. It also recognised 
the need to do more with a smaller budget, given the rate of defence inflation 
(which is generally above normal economic inflation). Faced with criticism 
stretching back many years which accused the Ministry of Defence of having an 
over bureaucratic approach to procurement (Kincaid, 1997, 1998), failing to 
prevent high defence inflation and in-service date slippage, the Smart 
Procurement Initiative was announced as part of the Strategic Defence Review. It 
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is hoped that these “radical changes … will deliver a forward looking 
organisation using up to date acquisition processes and procedures. The 
emphasis will be on flexibility … and continuous evaluation to avoid any danger 
of stagnation.” (Ministry of Defence, 1998, Supporting Essay 10, Paragraph 6) 
‘Faster, better, cheaper’ (Ministry of Defence, 1998, Chapter 8, Paragraph 161) 
has become the new catch phrase for the supporters of change but for others, the 
change in mindset is a difficult proposition. 
 
Smart Procurement involves a change from the previous Downey procurement 
cycle and a move to a more streamlined Acquisition cycle. The structure of this 
cycle aims to reduce risk by carrying out a more comprehensive assessment of 
projects at an earlier stage, while streamlining the approval process. (Jdir, 1998, p. 
7) Formal approval has been reduced from three to two occasions, the first time is 
during the concept phase (Initial Gate) and between the assessment and 
demonstration phases (Main Gate). 
 
Central to the implementation of Smart Procurement is the introduction of 
Integrated Project Teams, which are part of the drive to move from a functionally 
based management and reporting structure to a project based organisation. They 
will drive the management of major defence equipment procurement, balance the 
trade-offs between performance, cost and time, within boundaries set by the 
approving authority. These Teams will bring together all defence stakeholders and 
industry under a single team leader. They will be responsible for overseeing the 
complete lifecycle of the piece of equipment, and once in service, will move from 
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what was the Procurement Executive, now the Defence Procurement Agency, to 
the Defence Logistics Organisation where they will manage equipment support. 
 
Since the announcement of Smart Procurement much has been written on the 
potential benefits that Integrated Project Teams will hopefully bring. It is 
supposed that they will improve the interface with industry, create a better 
understanding of requirements and establish an environment where industry is 
motivated to perform (DPA; Galloway, 1998; The Financial Times, 1998) and so 
reduce cost, risk and time into service while improving product quality. The 
formation of a team should provide continuity, consistency, flexibility and 
increased performance due to the integration of a wide-range of functional 
activities and decision-making, as well as increased motivation. These may well 
be gallant objectives, but how achievable are they? What obstacles does the 
Ministry of Defence face in the implementation and running of these Teams? 
 
A Not-So-New, New Idea 
 
Integrated Project Teams have been described as the “centrepiece of Smart 
Procurement” (Nolan, 1998, p. 14) which itself has been described as a 
“revolution and complete cultural change in MoD procurement”. (Cook, 1998, p. 
37) Many of the initiatives in Smart Procurement may well be revolutionary, but 
the Teams themselves is not a new idea. The US Department of Defense adopted 
the concept in 1995 and introduced Integrated Product Teams, which consisted of 
“everyone with a stake in the outcome or product of the team, including the 
customer and suppliers”. (US Department of Defense, 1996, p. 2) Also, the 
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Society of British Aerospace Companies states that such Teams have been an 
integral part of the aerospace industry for the past five years. They refer to them 
as “cells of individuals, whose skills span the design, development, manufacture 
and through-life aspects of a platform or weapon system” and maintain that such 
Teams are a key element wherever lean manufacturing is practised. (Cook, 1998, 
p. 37) 
 
Similar thinking was expressed in the 1983 ‘Value for Money’ paper, where the 
Government recognised the need for improved management practices and 
“sharing the risks and costs, through international collaboration and/or joint 
ventures with industry.” (Pattie, 1983, Section II, p. 5) These ideas have been 
known variously as Integrated Procurement Management Teams, matrix 
resourcing or Multi Disciplinary Groups. (Ministry of Defence, Smart 
Procurement: The Integrated Project Team, p. 2) However, they were organised 
along functional lines, and according to McKinsey, characterised by an arms 
length relationship between the Ministry of Defence and contractors. This in turn 
inhibited the full exchange of information thereby preventing effective problem 
solving. (McKinsey & Co, 1998, p. 1) Integrated Project Teams could be viewed 
as another name in what is currently good management practice. The Challenger 2 
project team for example, maintains almost daily contact with their opposite 
numbers in industry at Project Manager level. (Inglis, 1999) In terms of in-service 
support there are cases where Ministry of Defence and industry teams are closely 
integrated, one example being the joint Royal Navy and contractor project teams 
established at Devonport Dockyard to manage surface ship and submarine refits. 
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Industry: Competition, Participation and Partnership 
 
Even after Smart Procurement, competition remains the Ministry of Defence’s 
primary tool for achieving value for money in defence contracts. Industry 
participation in the Integrated Project Teams will vary according to where in the 
decision cycle the project is and according to the competitive situation of each 
phase. (Ministry of Defence, Smart Procurement: The Role of Industry, p. 2) 
Industry may be involved in one of two ways. Firstly, through the participation of 
selected individuals from potential prime or sub contractors and secondly through 
secondment of an individual who is not from a potential supplier to the project. In 
the second case, it would be possible for that individual to be appointed as team 
leader. (Ministry of Defence, Smart Procurement: The Role of Industry, p. 3) The 
introduction of Integrated Project Teams will make it harder to strike a balance 
between industry participation and competition, and this may well be difficult to 
achieve in practice, despite what the Smart Procurement documentation says. 
 
Teams will form during the concept phase where it is quite likely that industry 
will be ‘co-opted’ on to a team, rather than being a full member. This is because 
several companies would be involved in providing solutions as part of the User 
Requirement Document process. (Ministry of Defence, Smart Procurement: The 
Role of Industry, p. 4) It is here that the first problem of competition is apparent. 
In order to produce an effective User Requirement Document, the Ministry of 
Defence requires industry to comment on aspects such as target costs, time scales 
and performance. Contractors will be loathe to pass on information that they feel 
will give a rival an advantage downstream. This will be even more apparent if 
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more than one company has been ‘co-opted’ into the project prior to the 
announcement of a prime contractor. At the same time, Smart Procurement 
concepts expect industry to be more willing to release data, than they have in the 
past. (Ministry of Defence, Smart Procurement: The Role of Industry, p. 4) Apart 
from stating that Team leaders will have to make arrangements to ensure that 
commercially sensitive information is protected from competitors, there is little 
advice on how this might be undertaken. 
 
Once the competition has been launched by Invitation to Tender, the companies’ 
‘co-opted’ membership of the Integrated Project Team will be temporarily 
suspended. Contributions made by contractors during the previous phase would 
however, be taken into account during the selection process. There is a fear that 
this process will not generate fair competition. The Ministry of Defence could be 
accused at first glance of using the ‘carrot’ of favouritism during selection as an 
incentive to contractors to share information during the User Requirement 
Document phase. Furthermore, there must be a question of fairness in respect of a 
contractor who joins at the Invitation to Tender phase without having been a ‘co-
opted’ member. 
 
Smart Procurement will see the introduction of a segmented approach to 
acquisition. There will be three tiers: low risk and unit cost items, minor projects 
of intermediate scale and technical risk, and major projects characterised by 
substantial risk and high unit cost. (Ministry of Defence, 1998, Supporting Essay 
10, Paragraph 11) It is the latter tier (major projects) that has received most of the 
attention so far, and provided a number of the Integrated Project Team pilot 
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projects announced under Smart Procurement. Teams will be formed for Tier 2 
projects as well, but will be capability based, and responsible for more than one 
project. As an example, the Land Systems section of the Defence Procurement 
Agency established a Dismounted Close Combat Team responsible for fifty-two 
projects. (Brown, 1999) In this sort of situation, it will be difficult to manage 
contractor participation whilst guaranteeing no party gains a competitive 
advantage. This view has been taken by the Defence Procurement Agency who 
suggest that multiple equipment Teams will work for Commercial-off-the-Shelf 
procurement but not developmental ones where developers are reluctant to pass 
on technological information. (Hudson, 1999) 
 
Additionally, while there is no intention in the Strategic Defence Review to return 
to the cosy world of cost plus arrangements, post main production contract 
partnering seeks an environment where participants recognise common goals and 
work towards them creating a ‘win-win’ situation. This approach could invite 
accusations of mediocrity. The Defence Procurement Agency team members will 
be conscious of their responsibility for prudent management of the public purse, 
while industry members will feel a responsibility towards their shareholders. 
There is a danger that “companies, confident that they will get work and support 
from their government, could lose interest in controlling costs and even quality”. 
(Taylor, 1998, p. 42) While there may well be a middle ground, human nature 
doesn’t always naturally seek it, and when the necessity to cut costs is removed, 
inefficiencies may develop. In order to avoid this, both sides must remain 
convinced as to the benefits of partnership, and contracts must be structured so as 
to allow industry to benefit from efficiencies achieved. In the longer term, 
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partnering post contract must support the ongoing viability of both Integrated 
Project Teams and industry. The Teams need to support the equipment through its 
life, at acceptable cost, and industry must remain profitable to survive. 
 
This is an area that must have further work. Industry must remain motivated so 
that it will enter a dialogue with the Ministry of Defence during the early stages of 
a project so that it can gauge requirements quickly and accurately. If this is not 
achieved, it is unlikely that equipment will be delivered on time, to specification 
or budget, and it will appear that the new procurement strategy is no better than 
the last. 
 
Organisational Issues 
 
There are a number of organisational issues that need to be addressed with regard 
to Integrated Project Teams. One of the major criticisms of previous efforts was 
the discontinuity and confusion arising out of the regular turnover of staff and the 
rotation of roles. (McKinsey & Co, 1998, p. 11) If the Ministry of Defence is not 
careful, Integrated Project Teams may repeat this mistake. Whilst Smart 
Procurement rightly acknowledges the need for the team leader to stay in post for 
four to five years, little attention is paid for the necessity for there to be continuity 
in the rest of the team as well. The McKinsey Consultency Report actually 
highlighted the need for the Operational Requirement or Capability Managers to 
stay in post for even longer (McKinsey & Co, 1998, p. 11), but no reference can 
be found as to the need to adjust military or civil service tour lengths. 
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The subject of the Ministry of Defence’s ‘ownership’ of Integrated Project Teams 
is rife with confusion. The main purpose of an IPT is to manage the whole 
lifecycle of a product that will move from the Defence Procurement Agency to the 
Defence Logistics Organisation once the equipment is in service. The detail of the 
transfer process is yet to be resolved. Consequently, there is talk of running 
parallel project teams within the Defence Logistics Organisation. (Hudson, 1999) 
This is obviously contrary to the ‘lean’ intent of Smart Procurement. Additionally, 
it is unclear where the new Teams will sit in the new Ministry of Defence 
hierarchy. Smart Procurement sees the eventual creation of a central defence 
customer, the Capability Manager, whose relationship with Integrated Project 
Teams is seen as “critical to achieving the full potential of Smart Procurement.” 
(Ministry of Defence, Smart Procurement: The Customer Supplier Relationship, 
p. 1) However, at this stage, it is unclear as to who will own the Teams in the 
future. 
 
Integration of internal stakeholders is essential to the Teams success. Early signs 
have been that this may not always be possible. Operational Requirement branch 
is not capable of meeting its membership commitments, of the twenty-five IPTs 
within the Defence Procurement Agency Land Systems section, at the last count, 
only seven had Operational Requirement representation. (Hudson, 1999) To 
enhance stakeholder integration Team leaders are empowered to consider co-
locating core members. (Ministry of Defence, Smart Procurement: The Integrated 
Project Team, p. 3) This however will be difficult as the three major internal 
stakeholders (Capability Manager, Defence Procurement Agency and Defence 
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Logistics Organisation) occupy three sites separated by between fifty and 120 
miles. 
 
Culture and Training – Converting the Dinosaur3 
 
The creation of Integrated Project Teams will mean a coming together of people 
from different organisational and business cultures. Teams will have to overcome 
differences in public and private sector organisations where “the former has a 
need to spend money legally, whereas in commerce it must be spent efficiently.” 
(Taylor, 1998, p. 41) A too closer relationship could see profit orientated 
companies exploiting the government by charging as much as possible. Industry 
tends to be less averse to risk than the Ministry of Defence and perceives that 
responsibility and authority are usually devolved to lower levels as well. Culture 
differences can be illustrated by the fact that some industrialists are yet to be 
convinced of the merits of Smart Procurement. For example, the chairman of the 
Society of British Aerospace Companies commented that “our main worry is that 
Smart Procurement is full of good ideas, but will they ever be exercised?” (Cook, 
1999, p. 37) Industry and the Ministry of Defence operate different reward 
philosophies, which will be a barrier to cohesion. A good year for a civil servant 
or military officer means a favourable personnel report, for an industrial executive 
it is a decent bonus in a profit related pay scheme. (Taylor, 1998, p. 43) These 
differences will have to be carefully managed if team cohesion is not to suffer. 
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Integrated Project Teams will represent a shift from current procedures and it is 
inevitable that there will be some resistance to that change. According to the US 
Loral Federal Systems (who published ten lessons learned from operating 
Integrated Product Teams) resistance to implementation is a major obstacle to 
success. In their opinion, overcoming the resistance means people must 
“understand the concepts, see the benefit to the project and understand the 
changes to their role.” (Popick & Shead, 1996) Strong leadership and change 
management are essential for these Teams to succeed. 
 
It has been written “no great improvements in the lot of mankind are possible until 
great change takes place in the fundamental constitution of their modes of 
thought.” (Mill, 1873, Chapter 7) The 1990s have seen substantial upheavals in 
the defence arena, and although Smart Procurement is not necessarily radical, it is 
being imposed on a traditionally conservative body. Commercially, value for 
money through the medium of competition has been the main driver for the 
Procurement Executive since the 1970s. Those involved have seen themselves in 
personal competition with both other Ministry of Defence employees and 
industry. This adversarial relationship was accentuated by the lack of 
accountability and delegated authority. (Kincaid, December 1997, p. 15) In short, 
for most Procurement Executive employees, there has been little incentive to 
achieve a closer relationship with Operational Requirements, the Defence 
Evaluation and Research Agency, or industry. Taken from an outside viewpoint, 
the rationale for reform is undeniable, but it is the people from each constituent 
body that will make the Teams work, and thus it is those people who must be 
convinced of the real benefit of change. 
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The answer is not an obvious one though, and a workforce does not tend to accept 
change lightly. Many civil servants who have been in their job a long time, are 
being asked to give up security for flexible employment, potential location 
changes and a more complex working environment. Integrated Project Teams are 
about co-ordination and empowerment, which could however be used as a reward. 
Potentially, those reluctant to change may be sidelined whilst the proactive are 
pushed forward to develop their careers. Fundamental to this process of change 
are education, leadership, the commitment of senior management, and a 
thoughtful personnel policy. 
 
In this vein, it is encouraging to note the recognition that the skills needed in 
procurement can no longer be acquired by either osmosis or experience. The 
Integrated Project Team Pilot Guide and supporting information (Integrated 
Project Team Pilot Guide 4th Edition, 1999) outlines a series of core capabilities 
that are expected of Team leaders and their teams, and a comprehensive training 
programme in both technical and teaming / communication skills is intended. 
Additionally, innovative proposals for the establishment of Commercial External 
and Ministry of Defence Internal consultants will do much to set a solid 
foundation for an effective management structure. 
 
To work effectively, the Defence Procurement Agency must attract and promote 
the highest quality personnel. Up until now, while a few civil servants have made 
a career from procurement, most senior managers have moved between the 
Procurement Executive, Ministry of Defence Headquarters and possibly the 
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Defence Evaluation and Research Agency. For the military, procurement 
specialisation is a rarity (compared with logistics). The introduction of an 
acquisition stream (Ministry of Defence, 1998, Supporting Essay 10, Paragraph 
25) for both military and civilian personnel will bring a previously unseen 
professionalism to the process. Unfortunately, for the military, it is probable that 
acquisition will remain a second choice career path. What is true for the 
government is also true for industry. In the case of secondment to Integrated 
Project Teams, industry will probably provide their best people when they see it 
as in their best interest to do so. As regards the competition to lead teams, the 
situation is more complex. Recruitment from the commercial sector will be 
dependent not only on job satisfaction and long term benefits, but also on 
financial reward and flexible contracting not normally present for public 
employees. The Integrated Project Team Pilot Guide provides the capability to 
pay bonuses for exceptional performances but pitching them at a suitable level 
and paying realistic base salaries will be difficult issues. 
 
Some Further Obstacles 
 
‘Faster, cheaper and better’ has become the slogan for Smart Procurement, and for 
these Teams to succeed they must achieve this objective as a minimum. It is 
important to note that the Ministry of Defence does not itself see the Teams as a 
guarantee of success. They state that “success will depend on the calibre of the 
team leader and their authority, both within the team and the quality of relations 
with industry and the customer”. (Ministry of Defence, Smart Procurement: The 
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Integrated Project Team, p. 1) In such an environment of uncertainty, how can 
Integrated Project Teams be expected to achieve the aim of Smart Procurement? 
 
It can be argued that the ability of Integrated Project Teams to reduce costs in the 
short term is limited because so many projects are already up and running and 
well advanced. (Taylor, 1998, p. 46) Around twenty-five per cent of the projects 
covered by the 1997 National Audit Office Major Projects Report accounted for 
some fifty per cent of the annual procurement budget. The integration of current 
projects is an area that must be addressed. (Taylor, 1998, p. 46) A poor 
performance from an existing non-Integrated Project Team project that attracts 
criticism from the National Audit Office has the potential to undo all the good 
work of the Integrated Project Team pilot programmes. 
 
Critics of Smart Procurement argue that the success of the Teams will be hindered 
by the lack of investment. These reforms have emerged in an era where the 
defence budget remains flat and unit costs of defence equipment maintain a rise of 
around 10 per cent a year. (Taylor, 1998, p. 41) To this must be added the 
probability that Integrated Project Teams will require a greater investment and 
rigour at the front end of the acquisition process in order to ensure capability 
specifications are met. (Smith, 1998, p. 38) 
 
Conclusions 
 
To conclude, following years of criticism, the MoD is attempting to modernise 
and update its procurement system. Central to these measures is the introduction 
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of Integrated Project Teams that bring together all the stakeholders into a single 
entity. In the course of this, much has been said about the potential benefits of the 
Teams but little about their limitations. 
 
So, what factors does the Ministry of Defence have to consider, if Integrated 
project Teams are to fulfil their potential and deliver the benefits of Smart 
Procurement? 
 
• Stakeholder Co-location – If one accepts that stakeholders should be housed 
together if Integrated Project Teams are to stand the best chance of success 
(Fleming, 1997), then it follows that Team leaders must have the ability to co-
locate stakeholders. At the moment the main internal stakeholders are 
geographically separated and in the case of Operational Requirements branch 
cannot fulfil all their Team commitments. There is an urgent need for internal 
stakeholders to be brought together on one site. While some elements of 
Operational Requirements may join the Defence Procurement Agency at 
Abbey Wood, to improve the chances of the Teams succeeding and give 
industry a single point of contact throughout the whole lifecycle of the project, 
the Defence Logistics Organisation must join. If the site at Abbey Wood is 
unsuitable then an alternative site should be found. Eventually, both the 
Defence Procurement Agency and Defence Logistics Organisation could 
merge (along with their respective organisations) to create a Defence Support 
Agency (Materiel) or similar. 
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• Information Technology – If it is not possible to overcome geographic 
separation, Information Technology and Electronic Data Interchange must be 
exploited to the full to bring stakeholders together within a common electronic 
network. All parties, including industry, must have the ability to exchange 
information over an Internet, which must also have the ability to hold online 
conferences. 
 
• Training and education – This is essential for all stakeholders so that cultural 
barriers can be broken down. The Smart Procurement documentation 
discussed the introduction of an Acquisition Stream with “career paths and an 
endurable culture of change”. (Ministry of Defence, Smart Procurement: 
Personnel and Training, p.  1) For this to work, continuity must be provided to 
all posts, not just the team leader’s, and the team leader must be able to adjust 
tour lengths at their discretion. Personnel must be thoroughly trained in 
Integrated Project Team practices. Smart Procurement proposes personnel 
attend modules at the time of appointment and at various stages of a project 
according to individual need. (Ministry of Defence, Smart Procurement: 
Personnel and Training, pp. 2 - 3) An Integrated Project Team training 
strategy is required urgently. 
 
• Rewards – To offset the differences in Ministry of Defence and military 
remuneration, there is a need to introduce some form of reward scheme for 
civil servants and military officers. At the same time, incentives should be 
introduced to reward successful Team performance. Suggestions proposed 
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under Smart Procurement include performance-related bonuses and ‘shares’ in 
an Integrated Project Team terminal bonus. 
 
• Industry Support – In order to ensure Team success, industry must be 
motivated to co-operate fully in the Integrated Project Team process. Without 
their full support, Integrated Project Teams will fail to improve the current 
procurement system. It is possible that this could be achieved through a 
combination of financial and non-financial methods. The former would 
include milestone payments and the offer of a completion bonus if the project 
were completed on or ahead of schedule, to budget and specification. Non-
financial methods would be aimed at breaking down some of the cultural 
barriers and would include the involvement of industry in Team training and 
education. The US Department of Defense has found that these Teams work 
better when contractors have an established Integrated Project Team system. 
(US Department of Defense, 1996, p. 11) The existence of such an Integrated 
Project Team culture within a contractor should be included as a selection 
criterion. 
 
• Independent Regulator – The appointment of an independent regulator would 
protect the Ministry of Defence from the risk of exploitation by single source 
suppliers. This idea has already been mooted, and the regulator would have 
the same role as OFTEL in regards public telecommunications and British 
Telecom. (Taylor, 1998, p. 42) A supervisory role during the concept phase of 
the Acquisition Cycle should be added as well as this would protect the 
Ministry of Defence from accusations of unfair competition when more than 
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one company is ‘co-opted’ into an Integrated Project Team. It may also give 
potential customers the confidence to share information, without fear of rivals 
gaining an advantage. 
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